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A
mAbstract
In this paper, we present evidence on how employers in developing and emerging
economies perceive employment regulations and react to them. We use harmonized
surveys of about 10,800 firms around the world, supplemented by indicators of the
stringency of employment protection that summarize detailed aspects of the labor
legislation. We find that firms facing tight employment protection invest more in
training, but also use temporary contracts to enhance labor flexibility. Using a
difference-in-difference approach to control for unobservable characteristics, we find
that small firms and those in sectors characterized by greater job reallocation are the
most directly affected by employment protection.
JEL codes: J23, J65, K31
Keywords: Employment protection indicators; Firm surveys; Training; Temporary
employment1. Introduction
Economists and policy makers have long debated the effects of hiring and firing regula-
tions on workers’ and firms’ behavior. Policy intervention in this area is clearly justified
by the need to protect workers from arbitrary actions and the fact that imperfections
in financial markets limit their ability to insure themselves against the risk of dismissal
(see e.g. Pissarides 2010; Blanchard and Tirole 2004). There could also be efficiency
considerations to the extent hiring and firing regulations promote long-lasting work
relationships that encourage firms’ investment in human capital (see e.g. Akerlof 1984;
Piore 1986). However, as with the majority of labor regulations, onerous employment
protection legislation (EPL) can have negative effects on labor reallocation and allocative
efficiency. By raising labor adjustment costs, employment protection regulations tend
to reduce job destruction but also job creation (Bertola 1992) thereby weakening the
ability of firms to take advantage of the opportunities offered by new technologies and
access to new markets that often require a change in the skill composition of the
workforce and, overall, hindering the required reallocation of labor from less to more
productive activities. This is all the more important as many countries, including a
growing number of developing and emerging economies, have introduced reforms in
their labor regulations in the past years in an attempt to promote labor market adapt-
ability and job creation.2013 Scarpetta and Pierre; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Bertola 1992; Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993; Koeniger and Prat 2007) and there is
a growing empirical literature supporting this prediction (from the original work of
Bentolila and Bertola 1990 and Nickell and Layard 1999, to the most recent contri-
butions at the industry and firm-level by Micco and Pagès 2008; Haltiwanger et al.
2008, 2013; Bassanini et al. 2010).1 At the same time, however, it is not clear
whether onerous employment protection legislation should lead to a lower equilib-
rium level of employment. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), using a general equilib-
rium model with entry and exit of firms, show that a tax on job destruction can
reduce employment rate significantly. However, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), extending
their model to include frictions and imperfect insurance markets, suggest that sever-
ance payments may be welfare improving insofar as the reduction in firms’ layoffs and
stronger search efforts by the unemployed reduce unemployment enough to compen-
sate for lower consumption levels due to higher costs for firms. Not surprisingly, the
cross-country empirical literature does not offer clear cut evidence of the impact of
EPL on employment and unemployment (see Addison and Teixeira 2003 for a review
of the literature).
This paper contributes to this debate by presenting empirical evidence on how
employers use strategies to overcome the potential costs associated with employ-
ment regulations. In particular, we assess whether employers tend to hire more temporary
workers when employment regulations on permanent contracts are constraining; or
whether they invest more in training to enable their existing workforce to adjust to new
technologies, instead of changing the skill composition of the workforce by recurring to
the external labor market.
Our data are drawn from surveys of employers conducted by the World Bank in the
past few years (see the Enterprise Surveys, World Bank 2004a). Our sample includes
10,800 firms in 44 developing and emerging economies. We supplement these
data with indicators of the stringency of employment protection legislation constructed
on the basis of detailed aspects of the labor legislation for about 140 countries
around the world over the same period (Doing Business Database, World Bank
2004b; Botero et al. 2004).
To anticipate our results we observe that de jure employment regulations and percep-
tions of regulations vary significantly across developing and emerging economies and
affect firm’s behavior in terms of provision of training and use of temporary employment.
When employment protection for permanent workers is relatively strict, firms tend to use
training to accommodate the workforce to the needs of new technologies, but are also
more likely to use temporary employment to enhance labor flexibility.2 The impact of reg-
ulations on firms’ behavior also varies a lot depending on salient firms characteristics.
Using a difference-in-difference approach to control for unobservable country and
industry-specific factors, we find that small firms and those in sectors characterized by
greater job reallocation are the most directly affected by regular contracts regulations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the theoretical and empir-
ical literature on the impact of strict employment protection legislation on the compos-
ition of labor demand and training strategy and report on the limited evidence available
for developing countries. This provides the motivation of our study and guidance for how
to model these issues and analyze them empirically. In Section 3 we present the micro
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Legislation, while in Section 4 we discuss the empirical model of the behavioral responses
of employers to EPL. Section 5 discusses the empirical results while Section 6 provides
the concluding remarks.2. Employment protection, training and temporary employment
By raising labor adjustment costs, strict employment protection legislation is likely to
push firms towards two main strategies: make greater use of temporary employment to
increase the overall adaptability of the workforce to changes in demand and/or re-train
their internal workforce. Facing greater integration in the global economy and rapid
technological changes, many developed and developing countries have eased regula-
tions on temporary contracts. They have extended the range of jobs that can be offered
on a temporary basis, prolonged the maximum cumulated duration of contracts and
allowed Temporary Work Agencies (TWA) to intermediate between demand and supply
(OECD 2008, 2013). The share of temporary employment has increased in many coun-
tries, in some cases to approach one-third of the total workforce (as in Japan and Spain).
In our survey data, about 45% of all firms declare to use temporary workers.
Evidence from France, Spain, Argentina, Peru, and Colombia also suggests that the
asymmetric liberalization of temporary contracts, while leaving in place strict regulations
for regular contracts, has led to significant shifts of labor demand in favor of temporary
employment. In Argentina and Spain the liberalization of temporary employment was
partially reversed after a few years because of the large expansion of temporary employ-
ment and, in Spain, net job creation really picked up only after the government re-
formed regular contracts in the mid-1990s. In Japan, non-regular employment
increased dramatically during the lost decade of the 1990s to promote adaptability of
labor among firms but it has been associated with greater dualism and a trend decline
in labor productivity.3
Training the internal workforce is another option to adapt the workforce without
recurring to possibly onerous firing costs (e.g. Cappelli 2000; Young 2003). However,
training is a valid alternative to replacing workers through firing and re-hiring only
under certain conditions. In particular, the training option is particularly viable if wages
are fairly compressed because there is a greater wedge between productivity gains through
training and the wage.4 The combination of wage compression and high labor adjustment
costs tends to favor a process of competence accumulation based on firm-supported
training and on-the-job learning. In this context, training may compensate for the
negative effect that employment protection legislation may have on the optimal alloca-
tion of workers (as illustrated in the case of Germany in Acemoglu and Pischke 1998).
In addition, firms may use training to make sure workers have adequate skills to be able to
adopt flexible work practices (Gittleman et al. 1998; Belot et al. 2007; and Acharya et al.
2010).5 In turn, internal flexibility is a strategy which can be a substitute as well as a comple-
ment to a strategy of involuntary turnover within firms (Cappelli and Neumark 2001).3. The data
For our empirical analysis, we rely on two main sources of data. First, we use the
detailed information on labor legislations in about 140 countries that is available in
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struct synthetic indicators of the stringency of employment protection legislation by
country.7 Second, we use firm-level information on firm characteristics, their percep-
tions about employment regulations and their responses in terms of employment com-
position (temporary vs. permanent) and provision of training from the World Bank
Investment Climate surveys.8Measuring the stringency of employment protection legislation (see Pierre and Scarpetta
(2004), World Bank (2004c) for more details)
Regulation of permanent employment
We focus on the following variables to characterize individual protection against dis-
missal for workers with regular contracts:
 Procedural requirements. They refer to the process that firms have to follow from the
decision to lay off a worker to the actual termination of the contract. They include:
1) the grounds for dismissal; 2) the delay before the notice of dismissal can start;
3) whether a third party must be notified or consulted; and whether dismissal
cannot proceed without the approval of a third party; 4) whether the law mandates
retraining or replacement prior of dismissal; 5) whether there are priority rules to
dismissal or layoffs; 6) and whether there are priority rules applying to re-employment.
 Notice period required by law for the dismissal of one redundant worker in
manufacturing with twenty years of tenure.
 Severance payment (including mandatory indemnity) for the dismissal of one
redundant worker in manufacturing with twenty years of tenure.Regulation of temporary employment
Indicators of the stringency of EPL for temporary contracts refer to: 1) the “objective”
reasons under which they could be offered; 2) the maximum cumulated duration of
a contract.
Detailed indicators for the different components of employment protection have
been first normalized from 0 to 1 from the least to the most restrictive in the country
sample. They have then been aggregated into two synthetic indicators for regular and
temporary contracts and an overall indicator of EPL. The aggregation process follows
previous studies (e.g. OECD 2008, 2013) and is largely based on simple averages of
detailed regulatory aspects (see Additional file 1 for details). The two synthetic indi-
cators pass simple validation tests: for example they correlate well with similar indi-
cators constructed by the OECD for its member countries, which are arguably the
most complete measures available.9
Our synthetic indicators of the stringency of employment protection legislation are
presented in Figure 1 aggregated at the regional level. Bearing in mind that there are
also large variations within each region (see Pierre and Scarpetta 2004), the Figure
suggests that the European and Central Asian region – which includes all central-
planned economies -- South Asia and Latin America have the highest incidence of
countries with fairly rigid regulations on regular contracts, often above the OECD
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Figure 1 Strictness of temporary and regular employment regulations – regional averages.
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these conditions only gradually during their process of development.10Employers’ perception of the stringency of employment protection legislation
Micro level data on firm characteristics, employers’ perception about labor regulations
and their behavior are drawn from the Investment Climate Survey (ICS) conducted by the
World Bank (World Bank 2004b). Overall, we have an estimation sample of a cross-
section of 44 developing and transition countries for which we have both regulatory
indicators of regulations and survey data.11 The aim of the ICS is to provide quanti-
tative data on investment climate which are comparable at the international and regional
levels. The survey is normally carried out under the auspices of national stakeholders,
which vary depending on the country. Because the priorities of these surveys vary across
countries, ICS are not all exactly the same. However, in order to make these as compar-
able as possible, a set of criteria were defined, in particular a set of core questions – with
the same wording - are asked in the same way in all countries.12
From the ICS database we have extracted responses on a specific question concerning
labor regulations: “Please tell us if any of the following issues are a problem for the
operation and growth of your business. If an issue poses a problem, please judge its severity
on a four-point scale”.13 Eighteen issues are proposed including labor regulations.14
The two other variables of interest are whether firms hire temporary workers (based
on a constructed dummy variable which equals 1 if firms employ temporary workers,
0 otherwise); and whether firms provide training to their workers (based on the ques-
tion “Do you offer formal (beyond “on-the-job”) training to your permanent employees?”).
Figure 2 shows how perceptions vary according to firms’ characteristics and regions.
Innovating firms and medium and large firms appear to perceive labor regulations
as a greater obstacle to business than other firms. Around 7 percent of firms in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia up to nearly 30 percent in Middle East and North Africa
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Figure 2 Proportion of firms which report labor regulations to be a major/very severe and
moderate obstacle by firms’ characteristics and region (%).
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they labor regulations are a moderate obstacle.154. Modeling firms’ behavior
Our empirical investigation is aimed at testing the assumption that firms that face more
stringent employment legislation tend to adjust the structure of their employment in
ways that differ from firms that face more flexible legislations. In other words, employ-
ment regulations, whether or not they have an impact on the level of employment,
are going to have a direct impact on the composition of employment, on the type of
staff and contracts that are used by firms.
In particular, we look at strategies that firms can use to overcome constraining em-
ployment regulations, and that affect the composition and the quality of employment.
These strategies are: making greater use of training to adapt the workforce to changes
in technology instead of resorting to the external labor market (an improvement in the
quality of jobs); and using of temporary employment to increase labor flexibility when
regulations of regular contracts are too constraining (a worsening of employment
contracts terms).
Whether or not employment regulations are constraining depends on a host of
factors, besides the strictness of the regulation itself. In particular, the impact of
regulations on employment is going to depend on the way they are implemented, as
well as on the characteristics of firms.
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of de jure regulations, and their enforcement, and the characteristics of firms. Pierre
and Scarpetta (2006) show that there is a significant cross-country correlation between
de jure and perception indicators of the stringency of employment protection legisla-
tion, once they control for firm characteristics, as well as for income per capita and
other basic country characteristics that tend to be correlated with the degree of en-
forcement of laws and regulations.16 These two types of measures therefore show
consistency and can both be used as complementary indicators of EPL.
We therefore investigate the issue at hand in two ways. First, we estimate the link
between perceptions and firms behavior. Second, we take a difference-in-differences
approach, comparing the behavior of different firms across different levels of the
employment regulation index.
Basic estimation model
The propensity to provide training or use temporary workers is not observed, we only
observe whether firms have actually provided training or employed temporary workers.
Moreover, the use of temporary instead of permanent employment and the provision of
training are not independent choices for firms. Depending on the regulatory environ-
ment in which firms operate, the underlying technology of the firm and its size and
other salient characteristics, training may be an alternative to the use of temporary
workers – e.g. when training allows skills adjustment which can alternatively be
obtained by recruiting temporary workers, or even as a complement, when it is difficult
to recruit skilled workers on a temporary basis.
We therefore test the hypothesis that these two decisions are correlated and use a
bivariate probit model that considers training provision and the use of temporary
employment simultaneously. In other words, we model the reaction of firms in a
two-equations model:
y1 ¼ X1β1 þ ε1; y1¼1 if y1 > 0; 0 otherwise ð1Þ
y2¼X2β2 þ ε2; y2 ¼ 1 if y2 > 0; 0 otherwise
Where y1,2* are two unobservable latent variables representing the propensity to pro-
vide training and employ temporary workers, and y1,2 the observable reactions of firms,
namely providing training and employing temporary workers. The random error terms,
ε1,2 are normally distributed with E[ε1] = E[ε2] = 0, and var[ε1] = var[ε2] = 1 but they
could be correlated, i.e. cov[ε1, ε2] = ρ. If a Wald test shows that ρ is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero then the two models can be estimated separately as standard probits.
If however ρ is significantly different from zero and the log-likelihood of the bivariate
estimate is significantly less than the joint binomial probit log-likelihoods, then y1 and
y2 are joint processes (Bertaut 1998; Greene 2003). The Wald tests all show that the
two processes considered here are indeed correlated (they reject the hypothesis that ρ
is equal to zero). We therefore present results only for the bivariate probit models.
Specifications
We first include the degree to which firms find employment regulations to be an obstacle
to their business operation and growth prospect as the independent variable of interest
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tioned above, by using this index, we can disentangle the impact of regulations for tem-
porary and regular contracts. This is interesting because they are likely to have different
effects on the provision of training and the use of temporary workers.
The other control variables are as follows in both specifications: (i) firms’ characteristics
(age, size of firm, industry, whether the firm has upgraded its products or production
line in the previous three years and ownership); and (ii) country’s income level. Table 3
presents descriptive statistics of all the variables.
Limited inference can be made from a cross-country analysis, as other country-specific
factors may be influencing the results. We therefore use a difference in differences approach
whereby we use an interaction of our measure of employment legislation with: (i) the size of
firms; and (ii) the degree of job flow “required” for the particular sector of the firm.
With the former interaction, we analyze whether different types of firms, which are af-
fected differently by given employment regulations (see Pierre and Scarpetta 2004), react
differently. Small firms, which are the least affected by regulations, can be taken as the ref-
erence category and the approach finds out whether larger firms have a different behavior
at given levels of employment regulation index. Moreover, as shown by Haltiwanger
et al. (2008), firms in industries that have different propensity to job reallocation
tend to be affected differently by labor regulations. We take this into account by
interacting the indicator of employment regulations with the industry-size job re-
allocation propensity indicator drawn from US data. Under the assumption that
regulations in the labor and product markets in the United States are among the
least restrictive, variation in job reallocation across industry-size cells in the United
States should proxy for the technological and market driven differences in job re-
allocation in the absence of policy-induced adjustment costs. If we also make the add-
itional assumption that these technological and market driven differences in the
demand for job reallocation carry over to other countries, we can test whether firms
belonging to different industry-size cells with different propensity for job reallocation
react differently to employment regulations that raise adjustment costs. In both cases, the
difference-in-difference approach allows to control for country and industry-size effects,
thereby minimizing problems of omitted variable bias and other misspecifications.Clustering
Including employment protection legislation, a national level variable, in our models
means that standard errors can be seriously biased downwards (see Moulton 1990).
This is because standard errors are likely to be correlated for observations within each
country, especially when the explanatory variable is auto-correlated over time and/or
across different units within one country. All the estimations of this paper therefore as-
sume that observations are independent across countries, but not necessarily across
firms in the same country. In addition, the estimations assume that observations may
not be identically distributed.175. Do firms use training and temporary employment to overcome strict EPL?
Before looking at the impact that labor regulations have on the behavior of firms, it is
interesting to review how this behavior changes according to firms’ characteristics. The









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perceptions (No obstacle)
Minor obstacle 0.009 0.020
(0.015) (0.020)
Moderate to very severe obstacle 0.046 0.061
(0.027)+ (0.027)*
Perceptions (no or minor obstacle)
Moderate to very severe obstacle 0.043 0.055
(0.026)+ (0.024)*
Age (Less than 5 years old)
5 to 15 years old 0.010 0.050 0.010 0.049
(0.021) (0.018)** (0.021) (0.018)**
16 or more −0.031 0.074 −0.032 0.073
(0.033) (0.039) (0.033) (0.036)*
Size (Less than 20 employees)
20 to 99 employees 0.165 0.056 0.165 0.057
(0.028)** (0.026)* (0.028)** (0.026)*
100 or more employees 0.305 0.040 0.306 0.043
(0.027)** (0.044) (0.027)** (0.043)
Publicly owned 0.053 0.018 0.053 0.018
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Innovator 0.158 0.065 0.158 0.065
(0.034)** (0.028)* (0.034)** (0.028)*
Manufacturing sector −0.056 0.097 −0.056 0.096
(0.042) (0.047)* (0.043) (0.047)*
Domestic ownership −0.107 −0.055 −0.107 −0.056
(0.016)** (0.025)* (0.016)** (0.025)*
Country income level (Low income)
Lower Middle income 0.219 0.092 0.219 0.092
(0.075)** (0.086) (0.075)** (0.086)
Upper Middle income or high income 0.414 0.205 0.414 0.206
(0.056)** (0.083)** (0.056)** (0.082)*
Observations (number of countries) 10771 (45)
Wald test for rho = 0 chi2(1) = 7.065 chi2(1) = 7.115
Prob > chi2 = 0.008 Prob > chi2 = 0.008
Predicted probability at the mean 0.535 0.450 0.535 0.450
Marginal effects from bivariate probit model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (and adjusted for clustering on country).
+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%. Where relevant, base categories of dummies are indicated
in parentheses in italics.
Data source: Investment Climate Surveys (World Bank).
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tracts. In particular, medium and large firms are more likely to provide training than
small firms (Table 1). Everything else being constant at their actual values, large firms










Age (Less than 5 years old)
5 to 15 years old 0.010 0.045 0.008 0.053
(0.019) (0.018)* (0.021) (0.019)**
16 or more −0.024 0.075 −0.034 0.099
(0.027) (0.033)* (0.031) (0.039)*
Size (Less than 20 employees)
20 to 49 employees 0.212 −0.005
(0.045)** (0.051)
49 to 99 employees 0.311 0.164
(0.048)** (0.074)*
100 or more employees 0.457 0.182
(0.051)** (0.121)
Publicly owned 0.028 0.007 0.060 −0.031
(0.037) (0.035) (0.040) (0.048)
Innovator 0.174 0.073 0.167 0.099
(0.023)** (0.026)** (0.028)** (0.029)**
Manufacturing sector −0.037 0.112
(0.044) (0.046)*
Domestic ownership −0.094 −0.046 −0.093 −0.039
(0.019)** (0.026)+ (0.019)** (0.023)+
Country income level (Low income)
Lower Middle income 0.244 0.108 0.250 0.137
(0.071)** (0.081) (0.072)** (0.074)+
Upper Middle income or high income 0.439 0.230 0.447 0.225
(0.049)** (0.083)** (0.047)** (0.067)**
Labor regulations indexes
Regular employment regulations 0.888 0.468
(0.229)** (0.199)*












Regular employment regulations* US job flow 1.720 0.845
(0.440)** (0.440)+
US job flow −1.350 −0.478
(0.169)** (0.181)**
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Table 2 Actual employment protection legislation and firms’ behavior (Continued)
Observations (number of countries) 10894 (43) 10512 (43)
Wald test for rho = 0 chi2(1) = 4.999 chi2(1) = 2.821
Prob > chi2 = 0.025 Prob > chi2 = 0.093
Predicted probability at the mean 0.534 0.449 0.538 0.446
Marginal effects from bivariate probit model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (and adjusted for clustering on country).
+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%. Where relevant, base categories of dummies are indicated
in parentheses in italics.
Data source: Investment Climate Surveys (World Bank).
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percentage points higher than small firms. On average, about 50 percent of firms
provide formal training.
Firms that have recently upgraded their production process or introduced new prod-
uct lines are more likely to use temporary employment and especially to provide train-
ing: ceteris paribus, they are about 16 percentage points more likely to offer training
than other firms, and about 6 percentage points more likely to use temporary workers
than other firms (Table 1).
Domestic firms are less likely to provide training than foreign owned ones and
slightly less likely to use temporary workers (Table 1). Older firms (5–15 years old)
tend to rely more on temporary workers than young firms (Table 1). We also find evi-
dence that firms in the manufacturing sector tend to rely more on temporary workers
than other firms (Table 1).
Turning to the link between firm’s perceptions and behavior, the results suggest that
firms that report being more constrained by labor regulations are more likely to provide
formal training to their permanent staff, as well as to use temporary workers. Firms that
find labor regulations to be a moderate or worse obstacle to their business are about 4
percentage point more likely to use training than other firms and 6 percentage points
more likely to use temporary workers.
When we use de jure regulations instead of the perception of regulations (Table 2),
we find that EPL for regular contracts has a strong effect on firms’ decision to provide
training and make greater use of temporary employment. By contrast, EPL for temporary
contracts does not discriminate firms’ behavior significantly (results not shown).18
Distinguishing by firms’ size, we find that despite being the ones more concerned
about labor regulations,19 large firms are only slightly more likely to provide training as
EPL become stricter, while small firms are very much affected and much more likely to
provide training. This is not the case for the use of temporary work, where no statistically
significant difference can be found across firms of different sizes, although small firms also
become more likely to use temporary workers.
The results suggests further that firms that belong to sectors/size cells that require
greater job reallocation (and therefore are more effected by labor regulations) are more
likely to change their provision of training than firms in sector/size cells that require less
job reallocation. This results in a convergence of the training provision of firms with high
and low job turnover. In particular, the gap of training provision between firms requiring
low and high turnover decreases from 46 percentage points in a country with low regular
EPL index to 7 percentage points in a country with high regular EPL index.20
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all small firms require high labor turnover, while larger firms tend to require lower
labor turnover. Overall, the results suggest that even though large firms may be
complaining more about labor regulations, because they tend to require lower job
turnover, they will only be slightly more likely to provide training when EPL is stricter.
On the other hand, small firms, which are less concerned about labor regulations but
belong to sectors that require high labor turnover, will be much more likely to provide
training when EPL is stricter.
The results suggest that large firms, which have low labor turnover, are unlikely to
have different human resources strategies when regular employment legislations are
more or less flexible. This is true, despite the fact that large firms tend to report being
more constrained by labor regulations when these are less flexible. When facing strict
labor regulations, large firms are therefore likely to resort to other strategies, which
may or may not alter the composition of their employment. For example, they may hire
cheaper staff, or staff that are not affected by specific regulations. On the other hand,
small firms, which face high labor turnover, are shown to change drastically theirTable 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Number of observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm provides formal training (0/1) 10894 0.527 0.499 0=no 1=yes
Firm uses temporary workers (0/1) 10894 0.451 0.498 0=no 1=yes
Perceptions (No obstacle)
Minor obstacle (0/1) 10771 .227 .419 0=no 1=yes
Moderate to very severe obstacle (0/1) 10771 .315 .464 0=no 1=yes
Age (Less than 5 years old)
5 to 15 years old (0/1) 10894 .540 .498 0=no 1=yes
16 or more (0/1) 10894 .308 .462 0=no 1=yes
Size (Less than 20 employees)
20 to 100 employees (0/1) 10894 0.322 0.467 0=no 1=yes
More than 100 employees (0/1) 10894 0.301 0.459 0=no 1=yes
Publicly owned (0/1) 10894 0.121 0.327 0=no 1=yes
Innovator (0/1) 10894 0.645 0.478 0=no 1=yes
Manufacturing sector (0/1) 10894 0.588 0.492 0=no 1=yes
Domestic ownership (0/1) 10894 0.822 0.382 0=no 1=yes
Country income level (Low income)
Lower Middle income (0/1) 10894 0.660 0.474 0=no 1=yes
Upper Middle income or high income (0/1) 10894 0.130 0.336 0=no 1=yes
Labor regulations indexes
Regular employment index 10894 0.341 0.132 0.09 0.68
Temporary employment index 10894 0.402 0.356 0.00 0.95
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/15human resources strategies, being more likely to provide training and also to use
temporary workers when labor regulations are stricter.Sensitivity analysis
To assess the robustness of our results, we have run two main sensitivity checks.21
First, we have tested whether the decisions to provide training to permanent workers
or hire more workers on a temporary basis are related to the changes in employment
of the firm. The results of interest are not affected by using this extended model
(results not shown).
Available data for a sub-set of countries also allow controlling for two other possible
factors influencing the decision to provide training or use temporary employment. First,
in many developing countries even registered firms may under-report their employment.
Underreporting may be substitute or complement to training and temporary employment.
Obviously it is not possible to control for underreporting directly. But the Investment
Climate Survey contains an indirect question that can be used to gauge the extent of
underreporting and informal employment in registered firms: “Recognizing the difficulties
many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of
total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for
tax purposes?”. Second, the need for training and temporary workers in a given firm is
likely to depend on the level of technology it uses, which can be proxied by the skill con-
tent of its workforce. We therefore calculate the share of skilled workers among perman-
ent workers in the firm. Introducing these variables – i.e. the extent of underreporting
and the skill content of the workforce -- in our models does not affect significantly our
main empirical results. Therefore, to maximize the number of countries and firms in our
sample we preferred to omit them from the analysis presented above.226. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented evidence on the decision of firms to provide training
and hire temporary workers in countries characterized by different labor regulations
that affect labor adjustment costs. In particular, we have looked at whether firms in the
sample make greater use of on-the-job training to upgrade the skills of the workforce
instead of hiring and firing workers, and whether they are more likely to use temporary
employment to enhance the adaptability of the workforce to the evolution of demand.
We have drawn our results from harmonized firm surveys covering 11,872 firms in 44
developing and emerging economies, and combined them with indicators of de jure
labor laws.
Overall, the findings suggest that labor regulations on regular employment contracts
have a significant impact on the decisions of firms to provide training and to recruit
workers on a temporary basis. Firms tend to use more both training and temporary
employment in countries where labor regulations are strict. This is particularly true of
small firms that require high job turnover.
All in all, this paper suggests that labor laws have an impact on firms’ behavior.
Training and temporary employment are used to circumvent the costs associated with
strict employment regulations for regular contracts, although not all firms use these
strategies.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/15Although our empirical analysis shows that the structure of employment is likely to
be affected by stringent labor regulations, it does not permit to conclude on the overall
optimality of these strategies or to balance their costs and benefits. They may for ex-
ample turn out to be costly in terms of level of employment; the share of temporary
employment in firms’ employment may be suboptimal. The cost of training may have a
negative effect on investment in other areas; spending on training may divert resources
at the expense of other investment. These are issues that deserve a closer look in future
empirical work.Endnotes
1Kugler (2007) also provides evidence from a series of empirical studies that have
looked at the effects of reform episodes on job flows in Italy, France, Spain, Germany
and the United States. These episodes provide “natural experiments” that allow com-
paring groups of workers targeted by the reform with groups of workers not directly
affected by the reform before and after the policy change in what is otherwise the same
macroeconomic and regulatory environment. The main conclusion of these studies is
that increasing the strictness of employment protection legislation reduces job (and
worker) flows, while the composition of employment is also swayed against young and
female workers.
2We use the terms permanent employment and regular contracts to identify a typ-
ology of employment that is distinct from a legal and regulatory point of view from
temporary employment, i.e. a contract that has a clear closing date.
3See Blanchard and Landier (2002) for France; Hopenhayn (2004) for Argentina;
Dolado et al. (2002) for Spain; Saavedra and Torero (2004) for Peru; Kugler (2004)
for Colombia.
4Lynch (1994), Blinder and Krueger (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) offer
some evidence of more firm-sponsored training in countries with greater wage coordin-
ation and wage compression.
5Flexible work practices include movement away from hierarchical management struc-
tures e.g. through improving workers’ input into managerial decisions, workers’ coordin-
ation through occupational lines, etc. (see Gittleman et al. 1998).
6http://www.doingbusiness.org/. Given the wide country coverage of the dataset
used in this paper, we could not use the more detailed OECD indicators of employ-
ment protection legislation that indeed focus on OECD and key emerging economies
(see OECD 2013).
7Unfortunately, the information does not permit to have a more disaggregated measure
of legislation. For example, it is not possible to find out whether it varies across regions,
or whether it applies differently to different firms.
8http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
9In order to check the reliability of our synthetic indicators of the stringency of
employment protection legislation, we compare them with those produced by the
OECD (OECD 2008). We have used, to the extent possible, the same underlying aspects
of the legislation and the same aggregation procedure. The comparison can be made
for 15 industrial and transition countries: Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/15and United States. The correlation between our weighted index for overall employment
regulation with the relevant overall OECD index is statistically significant at 1 per cent
level (correlation coefficient= 0.82).
10Indeed, while one might have expected a positive relation between the level of
mandated employment protection and income across countries (i.e. employment
protection is a normal good), the relationship is in fact weakly negative across our
sample of countries.
11Sample of 43 countries (Tables 1, 2 and 3): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Mali, Moldova, Nicaragua,
Oman, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Zambia. In addition, Tajikistan is in the sample for the model
with perceptions, and Nepal is in the sample for the model with de jure regulations.
12These common questions constitute a well-tested product of past surveys having
been pooled and consolidated from instruments of FACS, WBES and RPED surveys.
Together they constitute 50 to 60 percent of the full survey instrument, the rest being
items generating information for analyzing more specialized policy issues.
13Where 0 = no obstacle, 1 = minor obstacle, 2 = moderate obstacle, 3 = major obstacle,
4 = very severe obstacle. For our purpose, we merge responses 3 and 4 into the
category “major”.
14The eighteen issues are the following: Telecommunications, electricity, transporta-
tion, access to land, tax rates, tax administration, custom and trade regulations, labor
regulations, skills and education of available workers, business licensing and operating
permits, access to financing, cost of financing, economic and regulatory policy uncer-
tainty, macroeconomic instability, corruption, crime, theft and disorder, anti-competitive
or informal practices, and legal system/conflict resolution.
15Comparing the characteristics of this dataset with another survey (with a larger
number of countries, including industrial countries): the World Business Environment
Survey (World Bank 2000), we have found that, despite the different country coverage,
they do not differ substantially. For example, close to 70 percent of respondents in
WBES (60 percent in ICS) reported that labor market regulations represented an obs-
tacle (minor, moderate, major) to their operation and expansion. Around 16 percent
report that these regulations are a major obstacle to the operation and growth of their
business in ICS (14 percent in WBES).
16In particular, Pierre and Scarpetta (2006) found that medium and large firms are
the ones most severely affected. This is probably because in many countries where en-
forcement of regulations is limited small firms do not comply, remaining invisible to
regulators and inspectors. By contrast, larger firms are visible to the authorities and
thus unable to avoid regulations. Moreover, firms that have upgraded their production
process or their products are more likely to face severe constraints from strict employ-
ment protection legislation. This suggests the importance of employment regulations
for the adoption of new technology and potentially long-term growth.
17The cluster adjustment made to the variance-covariance matrix is standard and
described in Rogers (1993) and Williams (2000).
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porary workers is the stringency of the regulations affecting regular workers, as should
be expected. This may also be due to the fact that our indicators for temporary EPL
are limited and do not cover certain aspects of the regulatory system (e.g. they do not
consider temporary work agencies and procedural inconveniences for setting up a
temporary contract).
19Pierre and Scarpetta (2006) find that large firms are more likely than small firms to
report being constrained by labor regulations when these are less flexible.
20The predicted probability that firms that require high labor turnover (highest value
of index) provide training increases from 17 percent to 68 percent as the index of
regular EPL goes from its minimum value to its maximum value, while for firms that
require low labor turnover (Lowest value of index), this probability goes from 63 percent
to 75 percent.
21We also tried adding changes in employment in previous years – this variable is
of course endogenous because it is likely to be highly correlated with current changes
in employment which depend on the choice to provide training or use temp workers --
and found that the effect is generally not statistically significant in the training equation
while it is statistically significant in the temporary employment equation; in the latter
the inclusion of previous changes in employment does not affect the EPL results of the
difference-in-difference using firm size but does reduce the statistical significance
of the results using the difference-in-difference with US job flows.
22Full results are available from the authors.
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